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Influential dual-process theories of higher cognition posit that two qualitatively different 
processes underlie human reasoning. In contrast, single-process theories postulate that 
reasoners draw upon common cognitive mechanisms when making inferences. To test the 
competing theories, a rigorous method – state-trace analysis – has been proposed and proven 
to be a useful tool for beginning to diagnose the number of underlying psychological 
processes. This approach has been previously applied in exclusively adult based populations, 
suggesting that single-process theories of reasoning cannot be ruled out. However, to date it 
remains unclear whether such results hold across the period of child development. Therefore, 
the current study aimed to build a database of published developmental reasoning studies and 
to re-evaluate the data using state-trace analysis, to determine whether they best support the 
single-process or dual-process accounts. An electronic search of the PsycINFO and Scopus 
databases was undertaken to obtain empirical studies that have applied dual-process theories 
to examine reasoning in children or young adolescents (6-15 years). Two screening processes 
identified 10 papers that provided suitable summary data, forming a database of 78 datasets. 
State-trace analysis was applied to each dataset. Much of the developmental reasoning data 
were found to be consistent with a single-process account with one underlying latent variable, 
thus providing limited evidence for dual-process accounts of reasoning. More targeted 
experimental design and more stringent statistical tools are recommended for future research, 
to better understand the cognitive mechanisms underlying reasoning and its development. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Reasoning is a fundamental cognitive ability that develops across childhood and 
distinguishes humans from other species (Markovits, 2017). In its most general sense, 
reasoning can be defined as a mental activity that involves drawing an inference from 
evidence or in accordance with a set of rules that govern the type of inference (Overton, 
1990). The associated questions of how people reason and how reasoning develops have been 
very important research themes in the field of psychology.  
In exploring these questions, a key observation is that adults are prone to making 
systematic reasoning errors (e.g., Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Kahneman, 2011). 
Consider, for example, an argument evaluation task, in which participants are asked to judge 
whether an argument’s conclusion is deductively valid (Markovits, de Chantal, Brisson, & 
Gagnon-St-Pierre, 2019), such as: 
If a ball is thrown into a window, then the window will break.  
The window is broken 
Therefore, a ball was thrown into the window. 
In this example, the conclusion is deductively invalid because the window can be broken by 
means other than a ball, but the conclusion is believable based on background knowledge 
about the argument content. Therefore, if people correctly evaluate the conclusion based on 
whether it follows logically from the premises, they will decide that it is invalid. However, 
people often instead show belief bias – they judge the conclusion to be valid if its 
believability confirms with their prior belief (see Evans, 2008) – especially when under time 
pressure or when available cognitive resources are limited (also see Evans & Stanovich, 
2013). Such evidence suggests that there are two main processes of reasoning, with one being 




what cognitive mechanisms underlie these reasoning responses – whether they reflect the 
operation of a common core process or two qualitatively different types of processes 
(Stephens, Dunn, Hayes, & Kalish, 2020).   
While developmental psychologists have predicted and often observed improvement 
in the ability to reason from childhood to adulthood (e.g., Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Venet & 
Markovits, 2001), the literature has presented a complex developmental picture. Studies have 
provided evidence for unexpected developmental reversals, showing that children can 
sometimes reason more logically than do adults (e.g., Morsanyi & Handley, 2008), as well as 
evidence for U-shaped developmental functions, revealing that reasoning responses become 
less normative with age before turning more normative again (e.g., Chiesi, Gronchi, & Primi, 
2008). Empirical data from developmental reasoning studies can therefore be valuable when 
testing competing theories that were originally based on adult reasoning, to extend their 
validity, or to further inform them. However, seldom have developmental data been used to 
test or refine those theories – including testing for multiple reasoning processes across the 
childhood period (Barrouillet, 2011).  
1.2 Dual-process theories of reasoning 
A dominant framework for understanding different ways of making inferences is the 
dual-process model. Many dual-process theories of reasoning have been proposed (e.g., 
Evans, 2008; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 2004, 2011). These 
theories posit that two qualitatively distinct types of cognitive processes underlie reasoning 
responses, having in common a distinction between processes that are fast and intuitive and 




The two types of processes are often referred to as Type 1 and Type 2 processing1 
respectively. The central feature of Type 1 processes is their autonomy – their execution 
makes minimal demands on working memory (see Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Type 1 
processing thus tends to be rapid, has high processing capacity, and yields responses biased 
by prior knowledge. In contrast, Type 2 processing is not autonomous but seen as reflective. 
It involves effortful hypothetical thinking. Its defining feature is cognitive decoupling – the 
ability to sustain the decoupling of secondary representations. Type 2 processing thus tends to 
be slow, loads heavily on working memory, is related to individual differences in cognitive 
ability, and leads to normative responses (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).  
Despite the common recognition of two distinct processes that compete for control of 
the reasoning response, there are differences in opinion regarding how these processes 
interact. For instance, some theorists prefer a default-interventionist dual-process account, 
assuming that Type 1 processing will quickly produce a default response unless intervened by 
Type 2 processing (e.g., Evans, 2011; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). In contrast, others favour a 
parallel-competitive dual-process account, suggesting that Type 1 and Type 2 processing 
occur simultaneously at the problem onset and operate in parallel (e.g., De Neys, 2012; 
Handley & Trippas, 2015). 
1.3 Single-process theories of reasoning 
Although dual-process models currently dominate the reasoning literature, they have 
not gone unchallenged (e.g., Osman, 2013; Stephens, Dunn, & Hayes, 2018). Rather than 
having two different reasoning processes, single-process theories suppose that reasoners draw 
upon a common pool of fundamental cognitive processes when making inferences (cf. Keren 
 
1 Dual-process theories (e.g., Evans, 2011; Stanovich, 2011) have replaced the System 1/2 terminology 
with the Type 1/2 processing distinction. The terms System 1 and System 2 are problematic because they 
may incorrectly suggest singularity and the operation of two distinct brain systems while the two systems 




& Schul, 2009; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Lassiter & Goodman, 2015; Rips, 2001). 
Importantly, single-process theorists argue against the qualitative dichotomy between Type 1 
and Type 2 processing. Keren and Schul (2009) for example, noted that dimensions (e.g., 
judgement speed, resource-dependence) assumed to distinguish the two processes are not 
dichotomous but continuous (also see Kruglanski, 2013). Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011) 
have furthermore argued that the same rules can underlie both intuitive and deliberate 
judgements, proposing that the set of applicable rules are constrained by the task itself and a 
reasoner’s memory, while the final selection of a rule is determined by the perceived 
ecological rationality of the rule and the reasoner’s processing potential. More recently, based 
on a signal detection framework, a body of empirical work provides evidence for a single-
process reasoning model of the argument evaluation task, which assumes a single latent 
dimension for evaluating argument strength and allows response criteria (e.g., for endorsing a 
conclusion as valid) to shift across variants of the task (e.g., Hayes, Wei, Dunn, & Stephens, 
2020; Stephens et al., 2020). 
1.4 Dual-process theories – evidence and reliance on dissociation logic 
An important pattern of data for inferring the number of underlying cognitive 
processes to account for a psychological phenomenon has been dissociation – an observation 
that the performance on a task is differentially affected by one or more factors (Newell & 
Dunn, 2008). Accordingly, dual-process theories have advanced on the basis of dissociations 
in data and in particular on interaction effects revealed by statistical models such as analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) (Newell & Dunn, 2008). Key evidence for dual processes in adult 
reasoning has accumulated from experimental tasks that contrast a heuristic response option 
thought to be produced by intuitive Type 1 processing with a normative response option 
thought to involve reflective Type 2 processing, such as base-rate neglect problems, 




Neys, 2006; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). For instance, in the belief bias paradigm, 
participants make decisions about the validity of syllogisms that vary in validity (valid or 
invalid; this defines normative response options) and believability (believable or 
unbelievable; this defines heuristic response options). Typically, studies adopting the 
paradigm find a belief by logic interaction, whereby belief bias is much more marked on 
invalid syllogisms than valid syllogisms (e.g., Evans et al., 1983). Such an effect has been 
characterised as involving logic-based processes and belief-based processes, which supports 
dual-process accounts of reasoning (Evans et al., 1983).  
Stronger support for dual processes in reasoning has been provided by belief-bias 
studies with experimental manipulations designed to affect one type of processing while 
leaving the other unaffected. Remember that dual-process theories postulate that Type 1 
processes tend to be fast and autonomous, whereas Type 2 processes tend to be slow and 
working memory-intensive. Thus, limited time or increased working memory load should cue 
Type 1 processing and inhibit Type 2 processing. As predicted by dual-process theories, 
studies have consistently found a larger effect of belief and a smaller effect of logic on 
reasoning responses in participants under time pressure (e.g., Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005) 
and under concurrent working memory loads (e.g., De Neys, 2006). Conversely, a smaller 
effect of belief and a larger effect of logic on reasoning responses were found in tasks with 
strict instructions to reason deductively, which are thought to selectively increase Type 2 
processing effort (e.g., Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2010). Crucially, these interaction 
effects obtained empirically have been interpreted as strong evidence for dual-process 





Figure 1. Two different models of two independent variables (e.g., believability and validity 
in the argument evaluation task) on the two dependent variables (e.g., proportion correct on 
validity assessments under time pressure and no time pressure). (a) A possible dual-process 
model that assumes the performance on the two dependent variables is driven by two 
underlying latent variables, reflecting the output of Type 1 versus Type 2 processing. (b) A 
single-process model that assumes the performance on both dependent variables is driven by 
a single underlying latent variable, such as the subjective strength of an argument.  
However, reliance on the standard analysis of interactions to make inferences about 
multiple underlying cognitive processes can be problematic (Loftus, 1978; Wagenmakers, 
Krypotos, Criss, & Iverson, 2012). To help illustrate the problem, a diagram of the competing 
theories is shown in Figure 1, using the argument evaluation or belief bias task as an 
example. A dual-process model is in theory a multiple-parameter model in which the effects 
of independent variables (e.g., argument validity and believability) on two manifest 
dependent variables (e.g., observed validity assessments under time pressure versus no time 




processing) (Dunn, Kalish, & Newell, 2014). This can be contrasted with the simplest single-
process model with a single latent variable (e.g., subjective strength of an argument). 
A critical consideration is that the precise functional mapping between the dependent 
variables (which are measured) and the latent psychological variable(s) (which are inferred) 
is unknown (Loftus, 1978). Most importantly, the rejection of a single-process model on the 
basis of dissociations (i.e., interaction effects identified by linear statistical models such as 
ANOVA) usually depends on the strong and unwarranted assumption that the latent variable 
has the same linear mapping onto the observed responses for each dependent variable (see 
Stephens, Matzke, & Hayes, 2019 for a more detailed discussion). However, as demonstrated 
by Loftus (1978) and Wagenmakers et al. (2012), if these mappings are instead non-linear, 
interaction effects may actually reflect equal shifts in a latent variable across conditions (e.g., 
across the argument validity/believability conditions). Thus, dissociations can in fact be 
consistent with a single-process model. 
1.5 State-trace analysis and disappearing dissociations   
To avoid over-interpreting evidence as supporting multiple-process models, state-trace 
analysis (STA) has been suggested to replace the inferential role of dissociations (Newell & 
Dunn, 2008). State-trace analysis (Bamber 1979; Dunn, 2008) is a general method to help 
determine the number of latent variables that mediate the effects of one or more independent 
variables on a set of dependent variables. This approach overcomes the flaws of dissociation 
logic in that it subsumes other patterns of data (e.g., single dissociation or crossed 
dissociation – see Dunn & Kirsner, 1988) as special cases. Also, it makes a milder and more 
realistic assumption that each dependent variable is an unknown (and potentially different) 
monotonic function of the latent variable(s) and not necessarily a linear function. The 
assumption of monotonicity implies that changes in the latent variable are never followed by 




increases or decreases, the dependent variable always increases or decreases in the same 
direction or stays the same (Dunn et al., 2014). Notably, state-trace analysis has been 
increasingly used in reasoning studies and other areas of cognitive science and proven to be a 
useful tool in diagnosing the underlying dimensionality of experimental tasks that test rival 
single- and multiple-process models (Dunn et al., 2014). 
An important tool in STA is the state-trace plot (Dunn, 2008). By producing a plot of 
one dependent variable (e.g., conclusion acceptance rates under standard deductive or 
“categorical” constructions in the argument evaluation task) as a function of another 
dependent variable (e.g., ratings of how likely a conclusion is under alternative 
“probabilistic” instructions), one can infer the number of latent variables (or psychological 
processes) required to account for the observed data (see Figures 2a and 2b for examples). A 
monotonic plot indicates that the data are consistent with the operation of one underlying 
latent variable (e.g., Figure 2a), suggesting that there is no need to posit multiple processes. 
In contrast, a plot that shows non-monotonic discontinuities suggests the operation of more 
than one latent variable (e.g., Figure 2b), which may support a dual-process account. The 
general rationale is that if there is only one latent variable (e.g., subjective argument 
strength), a positive change in this variable that produces an increase in one of the dependent 
variables cannot simultaneously produce a decrease in the other dependent variable. In 
addition to the examination of state-trace plots, Dunn and Kalish (2018) have developed a 
statistical test that identifies the best-fitting monotonic state-trace curve (see examples in 








(a)                                                                       (b) 
   
Figure 2. State-trace plots of developmental data from Markovits and Thompson (2008). The 
dashed line shows the best-fitting monotonic curve. (a) A state-trace plot of data points that 
are fit perfectly by a monotonic curve. Age groups defined the two dependent variables. 
Instruction types and logical argument forms defined the four experiment conditions. (b) A 
state-trace plot with data points showing departures from monotonicity (the two leftmost data 
points). Instruction types defined the two dependent variables. Age groups and logical 
argument forms defined the six experiment conditions. (MP = Modus Ponens; AC = 
Affirmation of the Consequent.)  
When state-trace analysis was applied to adult reasoning data, limited support for 
dual-process accounts was found. Stephens et al. (2019) examined the results from nine 
papers cited by Evans and Stanovich (2013) as the best experimental evidence for dual 
processes in adult reasoning. The data were re-analysed using STA to test whether there was 
sufficient evidence for multiple latent variables. Results showed that the dissociations thought 
to reflect the operation of separate underlying reasoning processes largely disappear against 
the stricter criteria of STA. Many of the empirical dissociations were shown to be consistent 
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with one underlying latent reasoning process (Stephens et al., 2019). However, to our 
knowledge, STA has not yet been applied to developmental reasoning data. Given the 
observation of complex developmental patterns (e.g., Chiesi et al., 2008; Morsanyi & 
Handley, 2008), there may be stronger evidence for multiple latent variables in this case.  
1.6 Dual processes in reasoning development 
While dual-process theories have been developed to explain adult cognition – 
arguably a period of mature cognitive development (Evans, 2011), this approach has been 
extended to the important developmental question of how logical reasoning changes from 
childhood to adulthood.  
The key developmental prediction of many dual-process theories has been that 
analytic processes that can lead to correct logical decisions should become more common 
with development (e.g., Klaczynski, 2009; Stanovich, & West, 2000). Such a prediction 
follows from the robust evidence that general intelligence and working memory capacity 
develop steadily with age and correlate with the controlled Type 2 processing (see Evans, 
2011). The predicted developmental outcome has been tested on a wide range of reasoning 
tasks such as denominator neglect and gambler’s fallacy problems in which participants 
choose between solutions thought to reflect either intuitive Type 1 or reflective Type 2 
processing (e.g., Chiesi, Primi, & Morsanyi, 2011; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014). 
Consistent with the prediction, researchers have reported an age-related increase in normative 
responses on those tasks (Chiesi et al., 2011; Toplak et al., 2014).  
Nonetheless, drawing developmental predictions from dual-process theories has 
proven to be difficult. Amalgamating research results from different reasoning tasks, there 
has not been an entirely consistent trend for rational thinking to be monotonically increasing 
or decreasing with age (Stanovich, Toplak, & West, 2008). Beginning with the findings by 




– negative relations between age and normative responses. For instance, Morsanyi and 
Handley (2008) observed a marked rise in heuristic responses with age that was related to 
improvement in cognitive capacity. Adding to the complexity, other studies found that 
normative responses increased with age on some tasks but decreased with age on other tasks 
in the same population (e.g., De Neys & Vanderputte, 2011). Moreover, U-shaped patterns of 
reasoning development have been documented – that normative responses sometimes decline 
with age before becoming more prevalent again (e.g., Reyna & Farley, 2006).  
Dual-process theories have been used in an attempt to account for the complex 
developmental trajectories in terms of changes in both Type 1 and 2 processing. On the one 
hand, the age-related increase in heuristic responses in reasoning concerns the developmental 
course of Type 1 processing and the acquisition of mindware2 usable by Type 1 processing, as 
evidence suggests that children rely more and more on relevant knowledge (e.g., social 
stereotypes) and contextual or pragmatic cues to reason as they get order (Stanovich, West, & 
Toplak, 2011). On the other hand, Type 2 processing, which is often associated with 
normative responding, clearly develops with increases in cognitive capacity (Evans, 2011). 
Importantly, Type 2 processing must be able to suppress Type 1 processing in order to 
override erroneous automatic outputs (Stanovich et al., 2011). As a result, intuitive reasoning 
responses cued by context or based on background knowledge may be expected to increase 
from early to late childhood, and then decline in late adolescence and early adulthood as the 
ability to interfere with default heuristic responding and override with analytic reasoning 
finally develops (Evans, 2011). Given the potentially different developmental courses of Type 
1 and Type 2 processing and their related mindware, the observed developmental reversals 
 
2 Mindware is a term that refers to the knowledge, rules, procedures, and strategies that are stored in 




and U-shaped patterns on some reasoning tasks thus possibly derive from the complexity of 
these interacting processes (Stanovich et al., 2011).  
In summary, the developmental literature is mixed in its support for a dual-process 
account of reasoning, which indicates that child development of reasoning is an important 
context for investigating competing single-process and dual-process theories.  
1.7 The current study 
In the reasoning literature to date, state-trace analysis has been applied to data from 
exclusively adult based populations, providing some evidence against the idea that dual-
process theories provide a better account than a single underlying reasoning process. 
However, it remains unclear whether such results hold across the developmental period. To 
address this research gap, the current study sought to test single- and dual-process models of 
reasoning in a developmental context. To re-appraise the existing evidence for dual-process 
models, the goal was to build a developmental database and examine the data using the more 
rigorous approach of STA. Developmental reasoning studies were searched systematically, 
and summary statistics (i.e., means, sample size, and standard deviations) were collected 
from eligible studies. By focusing on developmental studies that have manipulated factors 
relevant to dual-process theories, this study attempted to maximise the opportunity to detect 
more than one latent reasoning variable, if this view is correct. The current study is thus well 
suited to clarify what cognitive mechanism(s) underlie reasoning performance, as well as 
help guide future experimental tests of competing single-process and dual-process accounts. 
1.7.1 Aims 
The current study had three specific aims: 
1. Build a database of published developmental reasoning studies that have involved a 




been applied (i.e., targeting reasoning studies that have manipulated factors relevant to dual-
process theories).  
2. Re-evaluate the reasoning data using state-trace analysis to determine whether there 
is sufficient evidence to reject the simplest single-process account with one underlying latent 
variable, and thus potentially support dual-process theories.  
3. Identify any experimental factors or designs that lead to compelling evidence for 




Chapter 2: Methods 
2.1 Literature search  
This study has adopted a systematic search strategy. An electronic search of the 
PsycINFO and Scopus databases was undertaken on 14 April 2020 to obtain studies that have 
applied dual-process theories to examine reasoning in children, up to young adolescents 
(under 15 years). PsycINFO was chosen as it comprehensively covers scholarly publications 
in psychology, and the multidisciplinary database Scopus was used for retrieving literature 
outside the coverage of PsycINFO. 
The search strategy involved using the subject heading “reasoning” in combination 
with key terms related to “dual-process theories” and the target populations. The detailed 
search terms and limiters are outlined in Figure 3. A preliminary search was conducted to 
determine the optimal combination of keywords. “Dual strateg*”, a keyword related to dual-
process theories, was not used in the final search because it did not contribute to retrieving 
extra literature. To maximise search results, most keywords were truncated, and the subject 
heading “reasoning” was exploded3 when searching PsycINFO on the Ovid retrieval system.   




child* OR adolescen* 
AND 
“dual process*” OR “two process*” OR “dual system*” OR “two system*” 
Figure 3. Search terms and strategy.  
 
3 The explode function in PsycINFO allows the subject heading and narrower terms below the heading to 




2.2 Study eligibility  
To be eligible for inclusion in the database of this study, all studies published from 
inception to 14 April 2020 were considered if they met the following inclusion criteria: 
1. the study was empirical; and  
2. included a sample of children with a mean age between 6 years and 15 years; and  
3. used a variant of dual-process theories to account for reasoning responses; and 
4. reported summary statistics that were based on non-categorical data; and 
5. had sufficient experimental factors and conditions for state-trace analysis (i.e., at 
least one relevant factor such as a time pressure manipulation that could define the 
two STA dependent variables and at least three conditions in which these two 
dependent variables were measured); and   
6. was published in a peer-reviewed journal; and 
7. had an English-language full-text version available.  
The screening process is summarised in Figure 4. A total of 186 studies were 
identified in the initial database search. Using the reference management software EndNote, 
all references returned by electronic searches were screened for duplicates. After the removal 
of duplicates, 140 references were retained. The inclusion criteria were then applied to the 
titles and abstracts of these references, which resulted in a pool of 106 potentially eligible 
studies. The full texts for potential studies were subsequently retrieved and examined against 
the eligibility criteria again to determine suitability for inclusion. The screening was 
undertaken by the author, with a subset of 20 papers checked by a second researcher. This 






Figure 4. Flowchart of the study selection process.  
2.3 Data collection and preparation 
The database of this study consisted of 78 datasets constructed from data provided by 
the 10 papers in the final sample. The data were extracted from experiments that reported 
condition means, and were based on various types of thinking and reasoning tasks, such as 




of large numbers problems. Details of the experiments are listed in Table 1. The database is 
available in the supplemental materials4. 
The construction of a dataset for STA requires different treatment of the experiment 
factors compared to more standard tests such as ANOVA. Given that a state-trace plot reflects 
the co-variation of two dependent variables across a set of different experimental conditions 
(Newell & Dunn, 2008), each dataset requires a key experimental factor to define the two 
dependent variables that will form the two axes of the state-trace plot (e.g., the factor 
categorical/probabilistic instructions defined the two dependent variables in Figure 2b). 
Crucially, to test dual-process models of reasoning, each dependent variable should plausibly 
be differentially influenced by Type 1 and Type 2 processing (Stephens et al., 2019). Other 
factors in the dataset should then be treated as independent variables that define the 
experimental conditions across the dependent variables, that is, data points in the state-trace 
plot (e.g., the factors, age and logical forms, defined the six conditions in Figure 2b).  
Accordingly, for the current datasets, the factor selected to define the dependent 
variables was the factor highlighted by experimenters and/or dual-process theories to have 
levels that differentially reflect the two types of processing. One type of such factor 
concerned the task characteristics. That is, the reasoning task itself (e.g., base-rate neglect 
problems; Felmban & Klaczynksi, 2019) contained conflicting information in which one kind 
of information was thought to cue Type 1 processing (e.g., stereotype-consistent evidence) 
and the other kind of information was thought to cue Type 2 processing (e.g., base rate 
evidence). Another type of dependent variable concerned additional experimental 
manipulations that were thought to enhance or inhibit Type 2 processing, such as un-
speeded/speeded judgements (Markovits et al., 2019) and categorical/probabilistic 
 





instructions (Markovits & Thompson, 2008). Lastly, where possible, different age groups 
were also used to define the two dependent variables. Age was a sensible factor in that dual-
process theories are fairly consistent in their predictions that reflective Type 2 processes 
develop with age as cognitive capacity increases (e.g., Evans, 2011; Stanovich & West, 
2000). Also, the individual differences literature in child development supports the idea that 
increasing chronological age is accompanied with improved cognitive abilities (e.g., 
Nettelbeck & Burns, 2010). Thus, responses from an older age group may reflect more Type 
2 processing than from a younger age group. Furthermore, when multiple factors within an 
experiment were available to define the two dependent variables, different datasets were 
constructed for the same experiment to allow each factor to define the dependent variables in 
turn. In this way, the database maximised the opportunity for finding evidence against one 
underlying latent variable. The alternative datasets were signalled as “factors inverted” in the 
database (e.g., dataset 62, see section 3.2 for an illustrative example).  
Summary statistics for each experimental condition were extracted from the relevant 
sections in each publication, when available. These statistics included the means, sample size 
(Ns), and standard deviations (SDs). Plot digitizing software was used to extract data from 
figures. Where only standard errors (SEs) were reported, SEs were converted to SDs by the 
author. As a range of behaviour measures were used for the dependent variables (e.g., 
percentages of normative responses, ratings for conclusion probability), scores were set to a 
0-1 proportion scale for consistency across datasets from different experiments. Datasets for 
Lin and Shih (2016) were an exception. Original scores reported by the authors were retained 
in the database because scores across the thinking tasks were already standardised and the 






2.4 State-trace analysis tools and application 
Data were analysed using MATLAB (Version R2020a). For each dataset, a state-trace 
plot was produced and the conjoint monotonic regression (CMR) test (Dunn & Kalish, 2018; 
Kalish, Dunn, Burdakov, & Sysoev, 2016) was applied to test whether there was statistically 
significant evidence against a single underlying latent variable. In general, a state-trace plot is 
produced by plotting the mean of each experimental condition for one dependent variable 
against the corresponding mean for the other dependent variable. Data points falling on a 
single monotonic curve correspond to a “one-dimensional” state-trace, indicating that the 
observed data are consistent with one latent variable. Departures from monotonicity would 
instead imply the operation of more than one latent variable. For instance, such a “two-
dimensional” state-trace would appear when data points form two separate monotonic curves, 
or a “cloud” of data points, suggesting the operation of multiple latent variables.  
In a similar vein, the CMR test examined the experimental conditions across the two 
dependent variables of each dataset and found a best-fitting (increasing) monotonic 
approximation of the observed data, via a custom optimization algorithm (Dunn & Kalish, 
2018; Kalish et al., 2016). A formal statistical test of the hypothesis that the monotonic 
approximation provides an adequate fit to the data was then conducted. In this test, the 
observed fit of the single-latent-variable model was compared to a bootstrap sample 
distribution of fit values under the hypothesis that the model was true, and a p-value was 
obtained. For all CMR tests, 10,000 bootstrap samples were used (Type 1 error rate, α = .05).  
The means in each dataset were used by the CMR algorithm to search for the best-
fitting monotonic function and the SDs were used in the bootstrapping procedure for 
estimating the variability of the data. As the database contained summary statistics only, a 
parametric bootstrap distribution was necessary in that the observed data for each 




relevant experimental conditions were not reported in experiments conducted by Ameel, 
Verschueren, and Schaeken (2007) or Markovits and Thompson (2008). Therefore, for these 
studies, the CMR tests were performed on estimated SDs. The three levels of possible SDs 
used in the Stephens et al. (2019) state-trace analysis of adult reasoning data were 
adopted: .10, .20, and .30, with .10 being optimistic – note that the mean for known SDs in 
the current database (based on the 0-1 scale) was .26. For nine Markovits and Thompson 
datasets (datasets 69-77), the raw data were actually dichotomous in nature as there was only 
one trial per cell, per participant; however, the group means could still be examined paired 
with estimated SDs of .10, .20, and .30, to simulate potential evidence, had more data been 
collected. Last, approximate cell Ns were used for each condition of Hagá, Garcia-Marques, 
and Olson (2014). As only the total experiment Ns were reported, the even allocation of Ns to 






Chapter 3: Results 
3.1 State-trace analysis 
The CMR tests were applied to 62 datasets with known SDs and 16 datasets with 
unknown SDs. The CMR test results for the total of 78 datasets are presented in Table 1, and 
sample state-trace plots with the best fitting monotonic curves are illustrated in Section 3.2 
(State-trace plots for all datasets are included in the supplemental materials5).  
Overall, 19 out of the 78 datasets (24%) returned a significant result on the CMR tests 
(p < .05) when the most realistic SDs of .30 were assumed for datasets with unknown SDs. If 
SDs of .10 or .20 were instead assumed for those datasets, 29 out of the 78 tests (37%) or 24 
out of the 78 tests (31%) were statistically significant (p < .05) respectively.  
After the example datasets in the next section, the results were further considered in 
two groups, based on the type of factor that defined the two dependent variables in state-trace 
analysis: first, dependent variables based on experimental manipulations, which included 
factors concerning task characteristics (e.g., familiar versus unfamiliar stereotype cues in 
base-rate tasks) or additional experimental manipulations (e.g., un-speeded versus speeded 
conditions); and second, dependent variables based on age groups.  
3.2 Illustrative examples 
Figures 5-8 show four examples of state-trace plots from the database: two significant 
(Figures 5 and 6) and two non-significant (Figures 7 and 8) instances. The corresponding 
datasets for the four sample plots are datasets 60, 61, 6, and 62 from the database. 
The dashed line superimposed on the data points of each figure corresponded to the 
predictions of the best-fitting monotonic model, found by the CMR algorithm. It was 
apparent from both Figures 5 and 6 that the monotonic model fitted the data poorly. In Figure 
 





5, the data points in the state-trace substantially deviated from the dashed line, which strongly 
suggested the state-trace was two-dimensional – or at least not monotonically increasing 
(there was actually a negative relationship between conditions in this case). Dataset 60 further 
returned a significant result on the CMR test (p < .001), indicating that these data were 
consistent with an underlying model with more than one latent variable. The departure of two 
points from the dashed line in dataset 61(Figure 6) similarly suggested the state-trace was not 
one-dimensional, and the CMR test for this dataset was statistically significant (p = .04).  
The visual inspection of Figures 7 and 8 suggested that each monotonic curve found 
by the CMR procedure fitted the data very well, as all data points fell along (see Figure 7) or 
close to (see Figure 8) a monotonically increasingly curve, leading to the inference that there 
was little evidence to reject the null hypothesis of a single latent variable. Correspondingly, 
neither dataset 6 (p = 1.00; Figure 7) nor dataset 62 (p = .75; Figure 8) returned a statistically 
significant result on the CMR test. These results indicated that the data were consistent with a 
model in which the effects of the independent variables on the two dependent variables were 
mediated by one latent variable.   
Moreover, note that Figure 8 is an example of rearranging a single dataset (cf. Figure 
6). Datasets 61 and 62 have both used the data from Markovits et al. (2019). The time 
pressure factor and the age factor defined the two dependent variables for datasets 61 and 62 
respectively. Notably, dataset 61 returned a significant result on the CMR test, whereas 
dataset 62 did not. Thus, the different CMR test results implied that time pressure was a more 








Figure 5. State-trace plot for dataset 60 in the reasoning database, from Lin and Shih (2016). 
Task characteristics (i.e., open-ended versus closed-ended thinking) defined the two 
dependent variables. Age groups defined the three experiment conditions. Reasoning 
performance was measured using the standardised scores for the thinking tasks. The dashed-
line shows the best-fitting monotonic curve. Error bars show SEs of the mean of each 
experiment condition. 
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Figure 6. State-trace plot for dataset 61 in the reasoning database, from Markovits et al. 
(2019). Time pressure defined the two dependent variables. Age groups, conclusion 
probability, and logical argument forms (MP versus AC) defined the twelve experiment 
conditions. Reasoning performance was measured using proportion of conclusion acceptance 
in an argument evaluation task. The dashed-line shows the best-fitting monotonic curve. 
Error bars show SEs of the mean of each experiment condition. 
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Figure 7. State-trace plot for dataset 6 in the reasoning database, from De Neys and 
Vanderputte (2011). Stereotype familiarity defined the two dependent variables. Age groups 
and conflict defined the four experiment conditions. Reasoning performance was measured as 
the percentage of correct responses in base-rate tasks. The dashed-line shows the best-fitting 
monotonic curve. Error bars show SEs of the mean of each experiment condition. 
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Figure 8. State-trace plot for dataset 62 in the reasoning database, from Markovits et al. 
(2019). Age groups defined the two dependent variables. Time pressure, conclusion 
probability, and logical argument forms (MP versus AC) defined the eight experiment 
conditions. Reasoning performance was measured using proportion of conclusion acceptance 
in an argument evaluation task. The dashed-line shows the best-fitting monotonic curve. 
Error bars show SEs of the mean of each experiment condition. 
3.3 Dependent variables based on experimental manipulations 
In the first group of 44 datasets where the factor selected to define the STA dependent 
variables was based on experimental manipulations, the CMR tests were applied to 38 
datasets with reported SDs from the original experiments and 6 datasets with estimated SDs 
of .10, .20, and .30. For datasets with known SDs, the null hypothesis of monotonicity was 
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retained for 21 (55%) datasets (p > .05). These non-significant results indicated that the best 
fitting monotonic curve found by the CMR procedure for each dataset provided an adequate 
fit to the data and were consistent with one latent variable. For the other 17 (45%) datasets 
with reported SDs, the results of the CMR tests were statistically significant (p < .05), 
suggesting that the observed data were consistent with an underlying model with more than 
one latent variable or psychological process. The null results were from De Neys and 
Vanderputte (2011) and Hagá et al. (2014), whereas the significant results included one 
Markovits et al. (2019) dataset (dataset 61). While the Klaczynski (2000) data and Lin and 
Shih (2016) data yielded mixed results, the former had only one dataset that returned a 
significant result, but the latter contributed to 15 positive results.   
As for the 6 datasets with unknown SDs, if low SDs of .10 were assumed for these 
datasets, 5 out of the 6 CMR tests (83%) were statistically significant (p < .05), suggesting 
that more than one latent variable was required to explain the data. However, if SDs of .20 
or .30 were assumed for these datasets, the number of significant results returned by the CMR 
tests dropped to 3 (50%) or 1 (17%) respectively, indicating the data were either ambivalent 
or more consistent with only one latent variable. For instance, regarding dataset 1 from 
Ameel et al. (2007) in which the task characteristics (i.e., the white-block problems were 
assumed to inhibit Type 1 processing) defined the STA dependent variables, the null 
hypothesis of a single latent variable could only be rejected when the estimated SDs of .10 
was applied in the CMR test (p = .02), whereas the null hypothesis was retained when the 
more probable SDs of .20 and .30 were used,  p = .21 and p = .38, respectively.  
3.4 Dependent variables based on age groups 
With respect to the 34 datasets in which age was the factor chosen to define the STA 
dependent variables, the CMR tests were performed on 24 datasets with reported SDs and 10 




known SDs, 23 out of the 24 datasets (96%) returned a result that was not statistically 
significant on the CMR test (p > .05), failing to detect evidence for more than one latent 
variable. The null results included data from De Neys and Vanderputte (2011), Felmban and 
Klaczynski (2019), Kail (2013), Klaczynski (2000), Markovits and Thompson (2008), and 
Obersteiner, Bernhard, and Reiss (2015). While some datasets from Markovits et al. (2019) 
have returned non-significant results, the only dataset (dataset 64) found to be statistically 
significant was also from Markovits et al. (p = .01), involving 11-year-old children and adults 
evaluating conclusions of conditional arguments, when given limited versus unlimited time.  
As with the previous group of datasets with assumed SDs, positive CMR results for 
the 10 datasets with unknown SDs gradually diminished when the estimated SDs changed 
from a low .10 to a moderate .30. When SDs of .10 or .20 were assumed for the datasets, the 
CMR tests respectively returned 6 and 3 statistically significant results (p < .05), providing 
potential evidence for more than one latent variable. However, if more realistic SDs of .30 
were assumed for these datasets, none of the CMR tests returned a positive result, suggesting 
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1) Gender / obesity problems  
2) Conflict / no conflict 
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 Chapter 4: Discussion 
4.1 Overview 
The aim of the current work was to test the competing single-process and dual-
process accounts of reasoning in a developmental context. This study built a database 
consisting of 78 datasets from 10 published developmental studies compiled using a 
systematic search strategy to which dual-process accounts have been applied. State-trace 
analysis was used to re-analyse the data to determine whether they best support the single- or 
dual-process accounts and to identify experiment factors or designs that can lead to promising 
evidence for dual-process accounts of reasoning. A key finding was that the majority of 
developmental data were consistent with a single underlying latent variable, presenting 
limited support for dual-process accounts of reasoning6. Notably, compared to chronological 
age, experiment factors concerning reasoning task characteristics or additional experimental 
manipulations were found to be more potent factors as dependent variables in state-trace 
analysis leading to evidence in favour of dual processes in reasoning development.  
4.2 Current findings  
4.2.1 Evidence in favour of dual-process accounts of reasoning 
The current study found some evidence to reject the simplest single-process account 
with one underlying latent variable, thereby providing some evidence for dual-process 
accounts of reasoning. According to the STA results nearly a quarter of the datasets (24%) 
showed statistical significance, suggesting more than one latent variable – note that these 
results were obtained when more realistic SDs of .30 were assumed for datasets with 
unknown SDs. The percentage of the significant state-trace results was as high as 37% when 
SDs of .10 were assumed, suggesting that more evidence of multiple latent variables might 
 
6 Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion in this chapter was based on STA results of datasets with 




exist in the developmental reasoning data. Although possible, such results were unlikely to 
approximate reality considering that the mean reported SDs in the database was .26. 
Moreover, assuming SDs of .30 for datasets with unknown SDs, none of the datasets 
(including those with known SDs) in the Stephens et al. (2019) database of adult reasoning 
studies showed evidence of multiple latent variables. In comparison, it appeared that evidence 
favouring multiple psychological processes was more pronounced in the developmental 
reasoning data than the adult reasoning data. Nevertheless, the evidence against one latent 
variable from this study should be interpreted with caution, considering that such evidence 
was mainly derived from a single study – Lin and Shih (2016).  
Interestingly, the Lin and Shih (2016) data contributed to 15 out of the 19 significant 
state-trace results of this study. The authors have evaluated a “dual-process account of 
creativity” theory, which hypothesised that open-ended divergent thinking and close-ended 
convergent thinking have different involvement of Type 1 and Type 2 processing. To some 
extent, the positive results provided favourable evidence for both the “dual-process account 
of creativity” theory (see Lin & Lien, 2013) and the more general dual-process account of 
reasoning (e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013) upon which the creativity theory was developed. 
However, the Lin and Shih data might have provided misleading evidence in support of the 
dual-process accounts. The design of the Lin and Shih experiment was distinct from typical 
reasoning experiments (cf. e.g., Markovits et al., 2019), in which common stimuli and other 
extraneous design features are held constant across two measures thought to differentially 
capture Type 1 versus Type 2 processing. Instead of controlling experimental factors in this 
manner, open- and closed-ended thinking was tested using completely different tasks with 
different instructions, stimuli, and scoring methods. Open-ended thinking was assessed using 
a divergent thinking test, whereas closed-ended thinking was evaluated using an insight 




experimental control left open the possibility that the two types of thinking processes being 
tested were not isolated. This allowed potential confounds (e.g., different task demands or 
stimuli) to potentially affect the experimental results and made it difficult to distinguish the 
factor that has driven the effects. Therefore, the evidence of multiple latent variables from 
Lin and Shih could not convincingly rule out a single-process account.  
The other 4 significant state-trace results were from datasets 32, 61, 64 and 70, 
providing potential evidence for dual-process models. Caution is needed in interpreting some 
of the evidence, given the inconsistent results across datasets from the same experiment. Out 
of the 16 Klaczynski (2000) datasets, only dataset 32 returned a significant result, which 
might simply be a Type 1 error. Similarly, when age defined the STA dependent variables, 
only dataset 64 from Markovits et al. (2019) showed evidence of multiple latent variables. 
Nonetheless, there was some good evidence in support of two-process accounts – or at least 
evidence against the simplest single-process account with one latent variable. As a 
comparison of fast and slow thinking, the two-dimensional state-trace of dataset 61 lent some 
support for the view of Markovits et al. in the existence of two simultaneously developing 
reasoning processes. Additionally, comparing less resource-demanding and resource-
intensive responses, the result of dataset 70 potentially supported the argument of Markovits 
and Thompson (2008) that non-use versus deliberate use of counterexamples in conditional 
reasoning are good indicators of the involvement of two distinct reasoning processes.  
4.2.2 Evidence in favour of single-process accounts of reasoning 
Crucially, much of the developmental data were shown to be consistent with a single 
underlying latent variable, as one-dimensionality could not be rejected for the majority of the 
datasets (76% overall; and 93% if excluding the Lin and Shih (2016) datasets). As such, a 
simple single-process account with one latent variable should be preferred to account for 




Wagenmakers, 2015). Although the developmental data to varying degrees have been 
explained in dual-process terms in the original studies, the current finding suggests that dual-
process explanations were largely unnecessary. This finding was more in line with the 
previous demonstrations that dissociation evidence for qualitatively different processes from 
adult reasoning data did not stand up against the strict criteria of STA (Stephens et al., 2019).  
It is necessary to note that half of the studies included in the database have adopted 
two important experimental paradigms in the study of reasoning – the belief bias and base-
rate neglect paradigms. These two paradigms have been used to test the predictions drawn 
from dual-process accounts of reasoning, and relevant studies have provided substantial 
evidence supporting the dual-process accounts (Handley and Trippas, 2015). Surprisingly, the 
data from the two belief bias studies in the database were largely found to be consistent with 
a single latent variable. Subjective strength of conclusions in the argument evaluation tasks 
may be the latent variable that typically compels the changes in the performance across 
experiment conditions (Stephens et al., 2019).  
More surprisingly, none of the three base-rate neglect studies in the database have 
detected evidence of multiple latent variables. In terms of reasoning with base rates, dual-
process theories postulate that Type 1 processing cues the stereotype-based responses, 
whereas Type 2 processing is required to accurately provide normative base-rate responses 
(e.g., Evans, 2010). The De Neys and Vanderputte (2011) study in the database was a typical 
example of this paradigm. Given the significant interaction effects reported by the authors, 
there was evidence from the original statistical analyses for both intuitive and analytic 
operations on the reasoning processes. A plausible explanation of why the De Neys and 
Vanderputte datasets returned null STA results was that the experimental evidence for two 
separate processes might have relied upon the linearity assumption, thereby failing to hold up 




did not rule out an alternative single-process account under which a latent variable drives the 
changes in the reasoning performance across different experiment conditions. Such a latent 
variable could be the relative strength of response options in the base-rate tasks.  
Lastly, the current study has included a wider range of reasoning tasks in the database, 
such as law of large number problems (Klaczynski, 2000) or contingency table problems 
(Obersteiner et al., 2015). As with the data from studies using the aforementioned paradigms, 
the data from studies using other thinking tasks have also shown little evidence against a 
latent variable. Weighing up both the significant and null STA results, this study found that 
across a range of tasks, single-process models show much promise in accounting for 
reasoning data that have been explained by more complex dual-process accounts.  
4.2.3 Experiment factors leading to evidence for dual processes in reasoning 
According to the results of the state-trace analyses, factors concerning experimental 
manipulations were more potent than age groups as dependent variables in STA at identifying 
evidence favouring dual processes in reasoning development. Consistent with dual-process 
theories (e.g., Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013), this finding presented some support 
that stronger forms of evidence for dual-process accounts come from direct experimental 
manipulations designed to dissociate Type 1 and Type 2 processing. Additional experimental 
manipulations (e.g., un-speeded versus speeded conditions) appeared to probe better for 
evidence favouring two reasoning processes than task characteristics (e.g., familiar versus 
unfamiliar stereotype cues in base-rate tasks). If low SDs of .10 were assumed, evidence of 
multiple latent variables was found in only half (51%) of the datasets that used task 
characteristics to define the dependent variables in STA, but in all of the datasets that used 
additional experimental manipulations to define the dependent variables. These additional 




processing effort (Markovits & Thompson, 2008) or imposing time constraints thought to 
inhibit Type 2 processing (Markovits et al., 2019).  
However, this comparison between the two subtypes of dependent variables might not 
be informative – the problem was that few datasets included factors concerning additional 
experimental manipulations that could be used as dependent variables in state-trace analysis. 
There were only 4 such datasets in the database, whereas there were 40 datasets that used 
factors concerning task characteristics as the dependent variables. Furthermore, if assuming 
SDs of .30, only one dataset that used additional manipulation as dependent variables has 
indicated evidence against one underlying latent variable – dataset 61 from Markovits et al. 
(2019). The positive state-trace result of dataset 61 demonstrated that un-speeded/speeded 
judgement was an effective experiment factor, leading to promising evidence for dual-process 
accounts of reasoning (see Figure 6). Also, it provided some support for the idea that 
reasoners would engage in a qualitatively different kinds of processing when they are allowed 
sufficient versus little time for reflective thought (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
Although developmental studies have found age-related performance increases or 
decreases on different reasoning tasks and discussed findings from a dual-process perspective 
(e.g., De Neys & Vanderputte, 2011; Felmban & Klaczynski, 2019), age groups were not 
found to be potent factors as STA dependent variables in probing for evidence favouring dual 
processes. Unexpectedly, evidence against one latent variable could only be found in 1 out of 
the 34 datasets where age defined the dependent variables. A plausible explanation for age 
failing to capture the distinction between separate reasoning processes in the developmental 
data is that age is an indirect measure of cognitive ability (Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West, 
& Stanovich, 2002). Cognitive ability is shown to highly correlate with Type 2 processing 
and is considered as a key factor in differentiating the two types of mental processing in dual-




aggregate data used might distort the picture that could emerge from STA, as they are an 
average across groups of individuals (Stephens et al., 2019). Given the proposed individual 
differences in the development of Type 1 and Type 2 processing (see Stanovich et al., 2011), 
age may play a better role in tapping into the Type 1/2 dichotomy and detecting evidence for 
distinct processes had the data been analysed at an individual level (i.e., with longitudinal 
data), or with subgroups based on cognitive ability at each age level.  
4.3 Strengths and limitations 
The current work can be seen as an example of how the field of reasoning 
development can benefit from the testing of single-process and dual-process accounts using a 
more rigorous method – state-trace analysis. Assuming a monotonic relationship between 
latent and dependent variables, STA is a more stringent inferential tool to use for testing 
whether the dependent variables are influenced by more than one latent variable (Newell & 
Dunn, 2008). Importantly, the use of STA could help address the problem of high Type 1 
error rates inherent in the use of linear statistical tools such as ANOVA when drawing 
conclusions about multiple psychological processes – a significant ANOVA interaction is 
often found when the state-trace result is consistent with a single latent variable, due to the 
assumption of a linear relationship between latent and dependent variables (Dunn et al., 
2014). Therefore, the application of STA on the reasoning data that were previously analysed 
with linear models allowed the current work to contribute less Type 1 error-prone evidence to 
theorizing about cognitive mechanism(s) underlying reasoning.  
The application of STA also revealed limitations of this study. Care must be taken in 
interpreting the STA results. When the null hypothesis of a single underlying latent variable is 
retained for a given dataset, the result does not prove a single-process account or conclusively 
dismiss the possibility of more than one underlying psychological process (Stephens et al., 




that two dependent variables across conditions were influenced by two latent variables in the 
same way. Indeed, when it comes to cases where the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, STA 
can only warrant conclusions that there is no evidence in the data that compels multiple 
mental processes (Stephens et al., 2019). Alternatively, evidence of a two-dimensional state-
trace may also be consistent with a complex single-process account in which multiple 
parameters are proposed (e.g., argument strength and response bias parameters; see Stephens 
et al., 2019). However, STA is a useful initial test of the simplest single-process account – and 
the current results indicate that often this account is sufficient.   
In addition, the STA CMR test is within the confines of a frequentist framework. For 
one thing, this study could not use the state-trace results to quantify evidence favouring the 
null hypothesis of one underlying latent variable (Stephens et al., 2019). For another, with the 
alpha level set at .05, it was possible that some statistically significant results revealed in this 
study were Type 1 errors, especially when a total of 110 CMR tests have been run and 
multiple tests have been applied to the same experiment data.  
Last but not least, there were limitations inherent in the data analysed in this study, 
highlighting the caveats on the STA results. First, the current study was not an exhaustive 
meta-analysis of all developmental reasoning studies. There were likely additional empirical 
studies relevant to testing the models that have not been included in the database. However, 
by focusing on studies that applied dual-process theories, the database was a stronger testbed 
for detecting evidence against a single latent variable. Second, STA was applied on aggregate 
data (i.e., data averaged over participants). In this regard, this study could only make claims 
about rival single- and dual-process accounts at an aggregate level rather than at an individual 
level. Third, the results of this study were to some extent reliant upon assumed SDs. The 
potentially significant results from Ameel et al. (2007) and Markovits and Thompson (2008) 




STA. Also, the use of known or assumed summary SDs meant that the exact variability of the 
relevant data was unable to be captured. The observed data for each dependent variable in 
each condition were assumed to be normally distributed; thus, the STA CMR results have 
relied on the use of the parametric bootstrapping (rather than non-parametric bootstrapping, 
which can be applied when the raw data are available). Last, some experiments in the 
developmental database might have been under-powered against the criteria of STA, 
especially for those with fewer experiment conditions (Stephens et al., 2019). For instance, 
the Obersteiner et al. (2015) experiment has only met the minimal design for STA; its dataset 
consisted of three conditions and returned a non-significant CMR test result. Given that the 
chances of detecting two-dimensionality would increase in datasets with more conditions (see 
Prince, Brown, & Heathcote, 2012), it was not surprising that datasets with a small number of 
experiment conditions failed to detect evidence of multiple latent variables.  
4.4 Implications and future directions 
Overall, the current work presents evidence that challenges the status of dual-process 
theories as the dominant theoretical framework in the study of reasoning. Extending the STA 
work on adult reasoning data (Stephens et al., 2019), this study found limited evidence 
favouring dual-process accounts of reasoning from the developmental data. Instead, the state-
trace results indicate that single-process accounts are promising in explaining most of the 
developmental data in the database. This finding contradicts the interpretations of the data in 
the original studies given, where most were explained in dual-process terms. Also, in 
screening for eligible studies for STA, it was found that dual-process theories have often been 
assumed to be a valid theoretical account, without directly considering or comparing 
predictions from single-process accounts. Therefore, findings of the current work suggest that 
dual-process accounts might have been bolstered by false positive evidence, while single-




psychology is facing a replication crisis (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012), this study 
highlights the need of also using more rigorous statistical tools in the analyses of data. This 
also has implications for other domains of cognitive science as far as drawing inferences 
about latent processes from behavioural data is concerned.  
According to Evans and Stanovich (2013), strong and converging evidence for dual-
process accounts of reasoning comes from experimental manipulations designed to affect one 
type of processing but not the other. Compared to the amount of empirical work done with 
adult populations (also see Stephens et al., 2019), reasoning experiments and especially those 
with additional experimental manipulations to most rigorously test dual-process models were 
found to be lacking with children or adolescents. Consider that the database search returned a 
relatively small number of studies (N = 140 after duplicates removal) and only 2 out of the 10 
eligible studies have included the experimental manipulations highlighted by Evans and 
Stanovich. This further indicates that many reasoning experiments were not designed to test 
the dual-process accounts. To address this research gap, future developmental reasoning 
studies are recommended to manipulate key factors thought to distinguish Type 1 and Type 2 
processing, to properly test the dual-process models. These factors can be low/high working 
memory load or cognitive ability, un-speeded/speeded judgements, or intuitive/deductive 
instructions (Stephens et al., 2019). Additionally, researchers could add testing formal models 
of reasoning to their research questions, evaluating quantitative instantiations of competing 
theories. Furthermore, the current work reinforces the need for researchers to be more 
cautious about the underlying assumptions of their statistical tests when drawing inferences. 
Instead of relying on task dissociations or interaction effects to infer latent process(es), 
researchers are recommended to design reasoning experiments for STA instead of ANOVA or 




demonstrating a two-dimensional state-trace should be the target data pattern, rather than a 
standard interaction effect.  
Lastly, given the need to further explore any two-dimensional state-traces revealed in 
state-trace analysis, signed difference analysis (SDA) is suggested for use in future research 
to distinguish competing formal, multi-parameter single-process and dual-process models 
(see Dunn & Anderson, 2018; Dunn & James, 2003). While STA can help determine whether 
one or more latent variables underlie manifest behavioural data, SDA can help identify the 
particular latent variables mediating the effects of experimental factors on the behavioural 
data. In short, these future research suggestions highlight the need of more rigorous evidence 
for advancing theoretical accounts of reasoning.  
4.5 Conclusion 
The current study has re-appraised developmental reasoning data from empirical 
studies to which dual-process accounts have been applied. According to state-trace analysis, 
only limited evidence was identified for dual-process accounts of reasoning. Much of the data 
are more consistent with a single-process account with one underlying latent variable. 
Findings from this study highlight the need to further test the competing single- and dual-
process models with better experimental design (e.g., using experimental manipulations that 
increase the chances of dissociating Type 1 and Type 2 processing) as well as more stringent 
statistical tools (e.g., STA or SDA). Ultimately, the aim is to provide a stronger evidence base 
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